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Jurisdiction
This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal by virtue of UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 782a-3(j) and 78-2-2(4)(2001).
Statement of Issue and Standard of Review
The sole issue preserved below and presented on appeal is whether a Municipality
has extraterritorial condemnation to acquire private property for the construction of
a public street and related utilities and services associated therewith. Resolution of
that issue involves interpretati< m < >f the I JT All CONSTITUTION, art XI, sec. 5(b)
and (c). Constitutional interpretation is a question of law which this Court reviews
for correctness, giving no deference to the trial court's conclusion. (State v.
Contrel, 886 P.2d 107, 111 (Utah App. 1994), cert, denied, No. 950059 (Utah
May 9, 1/995); Financial Bancorp, Im • v Ping} i >e & Dahle. Im , 880 P 2d I I, 16
(Utah App. 1994))

Constitutional Provisions, Rules, Statutes, Cases determinative of Appeal

UTAH CONST, art XI, § § 5(b)(c)
"The power to be conferred upon the cities by this section shall
include the following:

i

(b) To furnish all local public services, to purchase, hire,
construct, own, maintain and operate, or lease, public
utilities local in extent and use; to acquire by condemnation,
or otherwise, within or without the corporate limits, property
necessary for any such purposes, subject to restrictions
imposed by general law for the protection of other
communities; and to grant local public utility franchises and
within its powers regulate the exercise thereof.
"(c) To make local public improvements and to acquire by
condemnation, or otherwise, property within its corporate
limits necessary for such improvements; and also to acquire
an excess over than [that] needed for any such improvement
and to sell or lease such excess property with restrictions, in
order to protect and preserve the improvement."
UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-8-8. Streets, parks, airports,
parking facilities, public grounds and pedestrian mails.
They [municipalities] may lay out, establish, open, alter,
widen, narrow, extend, grade, pave or otherwise improve
streets, alleys, avenues, boulevards, sidewalks, parks,
airports, parking lots or other facilities for the parking of
vehicles off streets, public grounds, and pedestrian malls and
may vacate the same or parts thereof, by ordinance."
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-1. Uses for which right may be
exercised.
"Subject to the provisions of this chapter, the right of eminent
domain may be exercised in behalf of the following public
uses:
(3) Public buildings and grounds for the use of
any county, city or incorporated town, or board
of education; . . . pipes for conducting water
for the use of the inhabitants of any county or
city or incorporated town; . . . roads, streets
and alleys; and all other public uses for the
2

benefit of any county, city or incorporated
town, or the inhabitants thereof.
*

*

*

9) Sewerage of any city or town
The following provisions from the "Transportation Corridor
Preservation Act" UTAH CODE ANN. § 72-5-401 (2001)
et. seq.,
"(1) The department, counties, and municipalities may:
*

*

*

(c) acquire fee simple rights and other rights of
less than fee simple, including easement and
development rights, or the rights to limit
development, including rights in alternative
transportation corridors, and to make these
acquisitions up to 20 years in advance of using
those rights in actual transportation facility
construction. (Utah Code Ann. §72-5-403 (l)(c)
(2001))(Emphasis added)
"(2) In addition to the powers described under Subsection
(1), counties and municipalities may:
(a) limit development for transportation corridor
preservation by land use regulation and by
official maps; and
(b) by ordinance prescribe procedures for
approving limited development in transportation
corridors until the time transportation facility
construction begins."(Utah Code Ann. §72-5403 (2)(a)(c)(2001))(Emphasis added)

3

(5) "Taking" means an act or regulation, either by exercise
of eminent domain or other police power, whereby
government puts private property to public use or restrains
use of private property for public purposes, and that requires
compensation to be paid to private property owners. (Utah
Code Ann. §72-5-401(5) (2001)) (Emphasis added)
(4) "Official map" means a map, drawn by government
authorities and recorded in county recording offices that:
(a) shows actual and proposed rights-of-way,
centerline alignments, and setbacks for
highways and other transportation facilities;
(b) provides a basis for restricting development
in designated rights-of-way or between
designated setbacks to allow the government
authorities time to purchase or otherwise
reserve the land; and
(c) for counties and municipalities may be
adopted as an element of the general plan,
pursuant to Title 17, Chapter 27, Part 3,
General Plan, or Title 10, Chapter 9, Part 3,
General Plan." (Utah Code Ann. §72-5401(4)(a)(b)(c)(2001))
*

*

*

"(1) (a) The planning commission shall make and recommend
to the legislative body a proposed general plan for the area
within the municipality.
(b) The plan may include areas outside the boundaries of
the municipality if, in the commission's judgment, they are
related to the planning of the municipality's territory.
(Utah Code Ann. §10-9-302(l)(a)(b)(2001))(Emphasis
added)

4

Statement of the case
This is an action in eminent domain wherein a City seeks to condemn
property located in an island of "unincorporated" property within its municipal
boundaries.1 The City has determined that it is reasonable and desirable to extend
its existing public street by a connector road from University Ave eastward to
Canyon Road, thereby providing a major additional traffic artery from the northeast
quadrant of the City through the Defendants property (and others) and then
connecting with 4800 North Street in Provo and onto Center Street in Orem and
from there to the interstate freeway system. (R. 335) The District Court entered an
Order of Immediate Occupancy and the landowners filed a Petition for Leave to
File an Interlocutory Appeal to challenge that Order and that Petition was granted
by this Court. The sole issue before the Court2 is whether a municipality has
extraterritorial condemnation powers to acquire property for construction of a
public street wherein water and sewer will be located.
Summary of Arguments
The City contends that the UTAH CONSTITUTION grants to it the right to
condemn property "within or without its corporate limits" as required to provide

1

See Provo City Zoning Map, and illustrative maps showing the subject property,
environs and proposed location of the public improvements attached as Addendum
"A"
2
See Addendum "B"
5

"public services" and "public utilities" and that the proposed utilization of the
property accomplishes that public purpose.

The City maintains that statutory

provisions implement the Constitutional grant of extraterritorial powers and that it
has an express grant of such powers.

The City contends, alternatively, that it

has the power to condemn by "necessary implication" drawn from its expressed
powers of eminent domain.
Argument
POINT I,
A MUNICIPALITY HAS EXPRESS EXTRATERRITORIAL
CONDEMNATION POWERS TO ACQUIRE RIGHTS OF WAY
FOR A PUBLIC STREET

A municipal corporation is a political subdivision of the sovereign State
and is endowed by the State with powers to operate.
"Municipalities shall be political subdivisions of the State of
Utah, municipal corporations, and bodies politic with
perpetual existence unless disincorporated according to law."
(UTAH CODE ANN. §10-1-201 (2001))
As a political subdivision, its powers of eminent domain are dependent upon
an express grant of that power from the sovereign.
"That the powers of the city are strictly limited to those
expressly granted, to those necessarily or fairly implied in or
incident to the powers expressly granted, and to those
essential to the declared objects and purposes of the
corporation, is settled law in this state." (American Fork City
v. Robinson, 77 Utah 168, 292 P. 249, 250 (1930))
6

As a general rule, use of condemnation powers by a governmental entity
other than the sovereign itself is limited to the jurisdictional boundaries of that
governmental entity.
"As a general rule, the powers of a city are coextensive with
its corporate limits." (Plutus Mining Co. v. Orme, 76 Utah
286, 289 P. 132 (1930)).
Therefore, if a municipality is to possess extraterritorial condemnation powers it
must be by express grant from the legislature or arise by necessary implication
ancillary to such an express grant:
"Generally, a municipal corporation is confined to such area
and is without power to acquire or hold real property beyond
its territorial limits, unless the power to do so is expressly
given by the legislature."
(McQUILLIN ON
CORPORATIONS § 2.24 p.2-162)(Emphasis added)
*

*

*

"A municipality may also be granted power to take for its
own public uses land residing within the boundaries of
another city or town. However, such power is dependent
upon an express or implied grant of the power." (NICHOLS
ON EMINENT DOMAIN, 3rd Ed. § 3.03[3][a] text and fa.
31 .)(Emphasis added)
*

*

*

"The general rule is that the powers of a municipal
corporation cease at its boundaries and such corporation
cannot purchase or hold property beyond its territorial limits
unless the power to do so has been expressly conferred upon
7

it by the Legislature." (Koerber v. City of New Orleans, 76
So. 2d 466 (La. Ct. App. 1955))(Emphasis added)
"It has been repeatedly stated by this court 'that a municipal
corporation possesses and can exercise the following powers,
and no others: First, those granted in express words; second,
those necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the
powers expressly granted; third, those essential to the
accomplishment of the declared objects and purposes of the
corporation,-not simply convenient, but indispensable.' 1
Dillon Municipal Corporations, 5th Ed., p. 448, § 237;
Walton v. Tracy Loan & Trust Co., 97 Utah 249, 92 P.2d
724; Salt Lake City v. Kusse, 97 Utah 113, 93 P.2d 671;
American Petroleum Co. v. Ogden City, 90 Utah 465, 62
P.2d 557; Utah Rapid Transit Co. v. Ogden City, 89 Utah
546, 58 P.2d 1; Wadsworth v. Santaquin City, 83 Utah 321,
28 P.2d 161; Salt Lake City v. Sutter, 61 Utah 533, 216 P.
234; City of Ogden City v. Bear Lake & River, etc., Co., 16
Utah 440, 52 P. 697, 41 L.R.A. 305; 37 Am. Jur. 722."(Salt
Lake City v. Revene, 101 Utah 504; 124 P.2d 537, 540 (Utah
1942))
*

*

*

"A municipality has only such powers as are expressly
granted it by the legislature, such as may be necessarily
implied and incident to those expressly granted, and those
indispensable to the accomplishment of the declared objects
and purposes of the municipality." (Parker v. Provo City
Corp., 543 P.2d 769; (Utah 1975))(citing, Revene, supra.)
From statehood, Utah municipalities were granted very broad extraterritorial
condemnation powers in order to allow them to provide all "local public services
and utilities" to their residents:

8

"The power to be conferred upon the cities by this section
shall include the following:
#

#

*

*

(b) To furnish all local public services, to
purchase, hire, construct, own, maintain and
operate, or lease, public utilities local in extent
and use; to acquire by condemnation, or
otherwise, within or without the corporate
limits, property necessary for any such
purposes, subject to restrictions imposed by
general law for the protection of other
communities3; . . . " (UTAH CONST, art. XI,
§ 5(b))(Emphasis added)4
That extraterritorial grant of eminent domain power to municipalities was insulated
from legislative diminishment or infringement of any kind:
"Each city forming its charter under this section shall have,
and is hereby granted, the authority to exercise all powers
relating to municipal affairs, and to adopt and enforce within
its limits, local police, sanitary and similar regulations not in
conflict with the general law, and no enumeration of powers
in this constitution or any law shall be deemed to limit or
3

In the case sub judice the city is not seeking to acquire property within the
boundaries of another municipality-a circumstance which would seemingly conflict
with the retained right of each Municipality to "lay out and design" its own streets
under UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-8-8 (2001). But even in those circumstances
Courts have held that it is necessary to "balance" the public benefit between such
conflicting statutes and has estopped one city from preventing an adjacent city from
constructing a road within its boundaries by enacting conflicting zoning
regulations.(City of Scottsdale v. Municipal Court of Tempe, 90 Ariz. 393, 368
P.2d 637 (1967))
The power of the city to regulate the peace and good order of its citizenry is not
dependent only on statute. It is constitutional, being derived from Sec. 5., Art.
Xl"(Allgood v.Larson, 545 P.2d 530, 532;(Utah 1976) (dissenting opinion).

9

restrict the general grant of authority hereby
conferred;"(UTAH CONST, art. XI, § (5) (Emphasis added)
And the Utah Legislature further guaranteed those rights in subsequent legislation:
Nothing in this chapter [Eminent Domain] must be construed to
abrogate or repeal any statute providing for the taking of property
in any city or town for street purposes." (UTAH CODE ANN. §
78-34-17 (2001))
* *

*

"The powers herein delegated [Municipal Code] to any municipality
shall be liberally construed to permit the municipality to exercise the
powers granted by this act except in cases clearly contrary to the
intent of the law." (UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-1-103 (2001))
(Emphasis added)
Therefore provisions of state law which on their face may appear to suggest
otherwise are clearly subservient to the constitutionally guaranteed extraterritorial
right of eminent domain reposing in municipalities.5

5

See e.g.,

"City streets - Class C roads - Construction and maintenance, (1)
City streets comprise:
(a) highways, roads, and streets within the corporate
limits of the municipalities that are not designated as
class A state roads or as class B roads; ( UTAH CODE
ANN. § 72-3-104 (2001))
County roads - Class B roads - Construction and maintenance by counties,
(1) County roads comprise all public highways, roads,
and streets within the state that:
10

Accordingly, pivotal to resolution of this appeal is the determination of
whether a proposed public street, not located entirely within6 the extant boundaries
of a municipality and in which water and sewer lines will also be placed is either a
"local public service[s]" and/or one of the "public utilities local in extent and use"
permitting extraterritorial condemnation by a municipality.
Appellants assert that a public street is not a "public service or utility" but,
rather is "a public improvement" and is governed by art. XI, Sec 5(c) limiting
eminent domain to property "within" the municipalities corporate limits.
"(c) To make local public improvements and to acquire by
condemnation, or otherwise, property within its corporate
limits necessary for such improvements; and also to acquire
an excess over than [that] needed for any such improvement
and to sell or lease such excess property with restrictions, in
order to protect and preserve the improvement." (UTAH
CONSTITUTION, art. XI, § 5(c))
The City asserts that a public street in which water and sewer lines will also be
located are admittedly clearly "improvements" just as any and all constructed
facilities are "improvements," but a transportation improvement is also a "public

(a) are situated outside of incorporated municipalities
and not designated as state highways.(UTAH CODE
ANN. § 72-3-103(2001)).
^Technically the Appellants property is "within the corporate limits" of Provo City
as the exterior boundaries of the City completely surround their property. But it is
assumed that the issue for interpretation means "within" the jurisdictional
boundaries as opposed to pure geographic exterior boundaries.

11

services" or "public utilities" which can be located on easements obtained through
extraterritorial condemnation under art. XI, sec 5(b).
In construing and applying Sections 5(b) and (c)7 the Court is required to
make an initial determination as to exigencies sought to be addressed or remedied
by adoption of the specific constitutional provisions:
"In interpreting these words and ascertaining their meaning as
used, it becomes important to consider, in the light of the
conditions and growing necessities of the municipalities, the
scope and purpose of the entire provision. "Constitutions are
not to be interpreted alone by their words abstractly
considered, but by their words read in the light of the
conditions and necessities in which the provisions originated,
and in view of the purposes sought to be attained and
secured." Dillon Mun. Corp., sec. 3a." (State v. O'Meara,
23 Utah 13, 64 P. 460, 462(1900))(Emphasis added)

*

*

*

"A constitution is not to be interpreted on narrow or technical
principles, but liberally, and on broad, general lines, in order
that it may accomplish the object of its establishment, and
carry out the great principles of the government. The words
are not to be stretched beyond their fair sense, but within that
7

It should be noted that art. XI, § 5(b)(c) is the paramount source of a municipalities
eminent domain powers with only a few specific additional bequests made in
subsequent legislation-/. £., the right to condemn for pedestrian malls under UTAH
CODE ANN. § 10-15-5 (2001); the right to condemn water and water systems
under UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-7-4 (2001); outdoor advertising billboards under
UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9-409 (2001); and air rights, navigation easements and
non-conforming structures near airports under UTAH CODE ANN. § 72-10-413
(2001).All other takings for public uses and purposes must be premised on the
Constitutional endowment of art. XI, § 5 or UTAH CODE ANN. §78-341(3)(2001).

12

range the rule of interpretation must be taken which best
follows out the apparent intention of its framers." Black,
Interp. Laws, p. 13." {North Point Consol. Irr. Co., v. Utah
& S.L. Canal Co., 14 Utah 155, 46 P. 824, 825-26 (1896))
*

*

*

"Statutes which delegate the State's sovereign power of
eminent domain to its political subdivisions are to be strictly
construed. Des Moines v. Hemenway, 73 Wash. 29 130,437
P.2d 171 (1968); State ex. rel. Devonshire v. Superior Court,
70 Wash. 630, 424 P. 2d 913 (1967). However, as we said
in Devonshire, a statutory grant of such power is not to be so
strictly construed as to thwart or defeat apparent legislative
intent or objective." (In re Petition of City of Seattle, 638
P.2d 549, 557 (Wash. 1981)"
The Courts task in

construing legislation involving eminent domain is well

defined:
"The question therefore is, 'Is the right sought to be
exercised by appellant granted in any one or more of the
foregoing provisions?
If the right is granted, the court has but one duty to perform,
and that is to enforce it and make it effective. Upon the other
hand, if the right is not granted, either in terms or by
necessary implication, then the courts are powerless to grant
the relief appellant seeks." (Monetaire Mining Co. v.
Columbus Rexall Consol. Mines Co.,
53 Utah 413, 421,
174 P. 172, 175 (1918)).
Applying these interpretative guidelines it is respectfully

submitted that

"improvements" must logically refer to the common and customary usage of said
words pertaining to permanent buildings traditionally located conveniently "within "
the central portion of a city and constructed to conduct municipal activities therein,
13

e.g., its executive, administration and judicial buildings, schools, libraries,
hospitals, public security and maintenance buildings.

Whereas "services" and

"utilities" are less audacious and more fluid undertakings, often somewhat
consumptive in nature and thus being routinely enlarged, relocated, redesigned or
even vacated as changing conditions dictate. Being more aqueous in nature they
were not confined to the municipal boundaries but could be "within or without" the
city limits. Clearly water and its impoundment and distribution systems, sewer
collection and its treatment facilities, electrical generation sites and its distribution
facilities -traditional "utilities" were foreseen to often exist naturally, or by
preference and design, outside the city limits. And more modern "utilities" and
"services" (such as transportation facilities and systems, airports, trams, subways,
high speed commuter trains, ferries) have subsequently arisen and must fall
somewhere within these two original Constitutional provisions.
"Utilities" are defined by Webster to include:
"1 : fitness for some purpose or worth to some end
2
: something useful or designed for
use
3 a :
PUBLIC UTILITY b (1) : a service (as light, power,
or water) provided by a public utility (2) : equipment or a
piece of equipment to provide such service or a comparable
service
4 : a program or routine designed to perform or facilitate
especially routine operations (as copying files or editing text)
on a con uter" (emphasis added)

Services" are defined by Webster to include:
14

"1 a : the occupation or function of serving <in active
service > b : employment as a servant < entered his
service >
2 a : the work performed by one that serves <good
service> b : HELP, USE, BENEFIT <glad to be of
service > c : contribution to the welfare of others d : disposal
for
use
<Fm
entirely
at
your
service >
3 a : a form followed in worship or in a religious ceremony
<the burial service > b : a meeting for worship ~ often used
in
plural
<held
evening
services >
4 : the act of serving : as a : a helpful act <did him a
service > b : useful labor that does not produce a tangible
commodity - usually used in plural < charge for professional
services >
c
:
SERVE
5 : a set of articles for a particular use <a silver tea
service >
6 a : an administrative division (as of a government or
business) <the consular service > b : one of a nation1 s
military
forces
(as
the
army
or
navy)
7 a : a facility supplying some public demand < telephone
service > <bus service > b : a facility providing
maintenance and repair"
(emphasis added)
Since it is uncontested herein that one usage of the easement sought herein is
indisputably for the placement of traditional "public utilities local in use" (water
and sewer) it is perhaps unnecessary for this Court to determine if a public street,
alone, is a "public service" or "public utility" under subsection 5(b) or is a "public
improvement" under 5(c). But it is respectfully submitted that a public street is by
itself also a "public service" and/or a "public utility."
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An airport, comprised of miles of asphalt upon which motorized vehicles
transport persons in and out of cities has been held to be " . . . a well-nigh
indispensable public utility:"
"Judicial notice has been taken of the fact that airplanes have
been used for many years in the transportation of mail and
passengers, that large sums of money has been devoted to the
development of aircraft as a commercial industry, and that it
has become 'an important, if not, indeed, a well-nigh
indispensable public utility." (NICHOLS, "LAW OF
EMINENT DOMAIN" 2nd Ed. § 7.35(1) p. 7-203; quoting
Thrasher v. Atlanta, 173 S. E. 817, 819 (1958))
While several definitions within the Utah Code classify "utilities" in the
traditional sense:
(b) "Utility" includes telecommunication, gas, electricity,
cable television, water, sewer, data, and video transmission
lines, drainage and irrigation systems, and other similar
utilities located in, on, along, across, over, through, or under
any state highway. (UTAH CODE ANN. § 72-6-116 (l)(b)
(2001))
the legislature has included within the definition of "public utility" transportation
facilities for purposes of regulation by a special commission:
"(15) (a) "Public utility" includes every railroad corporation,
gas corporation, electrical corporation, distribution electrical
cooperative, wholesale electrical cooperative, telephone
corporation, telegraph corporation, water corporation,
sewerage corporation, heat corporation, and independent
energy producer . . ."(UTAH CODE ANN. § 54-2-1 (15(a)
(2001))(Emphasis added)
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And this Court has noted that providing transportation facilities is the
providing of "public services:"
"The appellant also claims that the case of Dooly Block v.
Salt Lake Rapid Transit Company is authority for its claim to
relief. There Salt Lake City had granted an easement to the
defendant to construct a railway in the street in front of the
plaintiffs business property. The use was for a private
corporation engaged in public services but for financial
gain."(Anderson Inv. Corp., v. State, 28 Utah 2d 379, 503
P.2d 144, 147 (1972) (emphasis added)
Moreover "local streets and roads" are "municipal services" for which
budgeting and reporting requirements are imposed by law:
(21) "Municipal capital project" means the acquisition,
construction, or improvement of capital assets that facilitate
providing municipal service.
(22) "Municipal service" means a service not provided on a
county wide basis and not accounted for in an enterprise fund,
and includes police patrol, fire protection, culinary or
irrigation water retail service, water conservation, local
parks, sewers, sewage treatment and disposal, cemeteries,
garbage and refuse collection, street lighting, airports,
planning and zoning, local streets and roads, curb, gutter,
and sidewalk maintenance, and ambulance service."
("Uniform Fiscal Procedures Act for Counties' UTAH
CODE ANN. § 17-36-3 (21)(22)(2001))(Emphasis added))
The District Judge below astutely pronounced in his ruling on the Motion
being reviewed: "The Court determines that providing adequate and reasonable
transportation facilities to, from and within its boundaries is one of the most basic
'public services' or 'public utilities' which municipalities generally provide, and
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therefore Provo City is permitted to utilize its constitutionally endowed power of
eminent domain to acquire the property necessary to construct its proposed public
street." (R.335)—and while no deference need be given to such conclusion, said
conclusion is difficult to rebut.
Recent legislation clearly shows the legislative acknowledgment of the
constitutional right and the intent to allow municipalities to acquire, by eminent
domain, requisite easements for public streets outside of their corporate limits.
The "Transportation Corridor Preservation Act" UTAH CODE ANN. § 72-5-401
(2001) et. seq., enacted in 2000 clearly envisions the possible "taking" of property
for streets by municipalities both "within and without" their corporate limits.
Under that Act

"the department [UDOT], counties, and municipalities" may

"acquire" easements or fee interests in land which those entities determine are
necessary for future transportation facility needs:
"(1) The department, counties, and municipalities may:
*

*

*

(c) acquire fee simple rights and other rights
of less than fee simple, including easement and
development rights, or the rights to limit
development, including rights in alternative
transportation corridors, and to make these
acquisitions up to 20 years in advance of using
those rights in actual transportation facility
construction. (UTAH CODE ANN. §72-5-403
(l)(c)(2001))(Emphasis added)
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This "acquisition" may be accomplished "directly or indirectly."

It is

accomplished "indirectly" by enactment of restrictions upon the future use and
development of property proposed for future transportation needs or by direct
acquisition (eminent domain or purchase):
"(2) In addition to the powers described under Subsection
(1), counties and municipalities may:
(a) limit development for transportation
corridor preservation by land use regulation
and by official maps; and
(b) by ordinance prescribe procedures for
approving
limited
development
in
transportation corridors until the time
transportation
facility
construction
begins. "(UTAH CODE ANN. § 72-5-403
(2)(a), (c)(2001))
The Act acknowledging that such activity may well rise to a quantum of
interference with private property rights so as to constitute a " regulatory taking"
under other recently enacted legislation:
"(1) The department, counties, and municipalities shall
observe all protections conferred on private property rights,
including Title 63, Chapter 90, Private Property Protection
Act, Title 63, Chapter 90a, Constitutional Taking Issues,
and compensation for takings. (UTAH CODE ANN. § 725-405 (1)(2001))8

8

"Regulatory takings" require condemnation and payment of just compensation:
"As used in this chapter:
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This concept of "regulatory takings" is perpetuated in the Transportation Corridor
Preservation Act as well:
(5) "Taking" means an act or regulation, either by exercise
of eminent domain or other police power, whereby
government puts private property to public use or restrains
use of private property for public purposes, and that
requires compensation to be paid to private property owners.
(UTAH CODE ANN. § 72-5-40 l(5)(2001))(Emphasis
added)
Or, as noted above, the action may be "direcdy" " . . . by exercise of eminent
domain." In summary, a municipality is permitted to "take" either by act or
regulation, or by the exercise of eminent domain, requisite easements or fee
interest in property for future transportation facilities. And how is this acquisition
to be accomplished?

By including said designated "corridors" within their

adopted and recorded general land use plans:
"(4) "Official map" means a map, drawn by government
authorities and recorded in county recording offices that:
(1) "Constitutional taking issues" means actions involving the physical taking or
exaction of private real property by a political subdivision that might require
compensation to a private real property owner because of:
(a) the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States;
(b) Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution; or
(2) "Political subdivision" means a county, municipality, special district, school
district, or other local government entity. ( UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-90a-l
(2001))
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(a) shows actual and proposed rights-of-way,
centerline alignments, and setbacks for
highways and other transportation facilities;
(b) provides a basis for restricting development
in designated rights-of-way or between
designated setbacks to allow the government
authorities time to purchase or otherwise
reserve the land; and
(c) for counties and municipalities may be
adopted as an element of the general plan,
pursuant to Title 17, Chapter 27, Part 3,
General Plan, or Title 10, Chapter 9, Part 3,
General Plan." (UTAH CODE ANN. § 72-5401(4)(a)(b)(c)(2001))

Under UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9-302 (2001) referred to above a municipality is
specifically permitted to include for future development and use areas "outside the
boundaries of the municipality:"
"(1) (a) The planning commission shall make and
recommend to the legislative body a proposed general plan
for the area within the municipality.
(b) The plan may include areas outside the boundaries of
the municipality if, in the commission's judgment, they
are related to the planning of the municipality's territory.
(UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9-302(l)(a)(b)(2001))

Therefore, it is futile to argue that a municipality cannot directly act under art. XI,
sec 5(b) and acquire by extraterritorial condemnation property needed for a public
transportation facility when it could indirectly acquire those same easements,
extraterritorially, by the enactment of restrictions on the development of such
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proposed future street sites with such prohibitory regulation on use of the land for
any contrary purpose so that the enactment itself constitutes a " regulatory taking"
and requires condemnation and payment of just compensation under the
"Transportation Corridor Preservation Act" and " Private Property Protection
Act." A city cannot be compelled to take such an indirect and circuitous route to
acquire this land when the Constitution prohibits restrictive legislation on a
municipality's rights to directly acquire property by extraterritorial condemnation.
POINT II

A MUNICIPALITY HAS IMPLIED EXTRATERRITORIAL
CONDEMNATION POWERS TO ACQUIRE RIGHTS OF
WAY FOR A PUBLIC STREET.
In addition to extraterritorial condemnation powers expressly granted, cities
must have such powers to extend and connect their public streets, water and sewer
facilities from one portion of their boundaries to another through temporary
unincorporated areas under the " reasonably necessarily implied" doctrine.
"The powers of a city are strictly limited to those expressly
granted, to those necessarily or fairly implied in or incident
to the powers expressly granted, and to those essential to the
declared objects and purposes of the corporation."(
American Fork City v. Robinson, 11 Utah 168, 292 P. 249
(1930); Stevenson v. Salt Lake City Corp., 1 Utah 2d 28,
317 P.2d 597 (1957); Salt Lake City v. Revene, 101 Utah
504, 124 P.2d 537, modified on other grounds, 101 Utah
512, 127 P.2d 254 (1942); (Salt Lake City v. Sutter, 61 Utah
533; 216 P. 234; 235 (1923)(Emphasis added)
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*

*

*

"Accordingly, while there is no settled rule in respect to this
question, if the power exists to construct public works or
improve property outside the municipal limits, and the
statute or charter expressly or by necessary implication
authorizes the condemnation of property within the
corporate limits for such purposes, then the municipality is
impliedly authorized to condemn outside the limits for such
purposes."
(McQUILLIN,
"MUNICIPAL
CORPORATIONS" § 32.66 P. 524. citing North
Sacramento v. Citizens Util. Co. of Calif., 192 Cal App 2d
482, 13 Cal Rptr 538; Carlsbad v. Wight, 221 Cal App 2d
911, 34 Cal Rptr 820; Village ofDeerfield v. Rapka, 54 111
2d 217, 296 NE2d 336; Helm v. Grayville, 224 111 274, 79
NE 689; City of Gulfport v. Orange Grove Utilities, 735 So
2d 1041 (Miss 1999); City of Springfield v. Brechbuhler,
895 SW2d 583 (Mo. 1995); Central Power Co. v. Nebraska
City, 112 F2d 471; Charlotte v. Heath, 226 NC 750, 40
SE2d 600; Payallup v. Lacey, 43 Wash 110, 86 P. 215))
This Court has applied the "necessarily implied" doctrine of Sutter to find
jurisdiction to condemn where, as in the case sub judice,
services" are involved.
Court

held

multiple "public

In Utah DOT v. Fuller, 603 P.2d 814 (Utah 1979) this

that UDOT could

condemn property for a "sewage treatment

lagoon" impliedly from its grant of power to condemn for a "rest stop" where
drinking water and toilet facilities were to be constructed.
"Plaintiffs authority to acquire real property for highway
purposes generally and roadside rest areas specifically is set
out in § 27-12-96 and subsection (11), Utah Code Annotated
(1953), as amended. That statute states that the term
'highway purposes' is not limited exclusively to those
23

enumerated. It is obvious that rest areas offering drinking
water and toilet facilities require waste disposal provisions.
The record in this case supports the sewage lagoon as the
disposal method of choice. Since the statutory language
authorizes 'the construction and maintenance of roadside rest
areas,' and the term 'maintenance' would logically include
waste disposal necessitated by services offered at the rest
area, the power to construct and maintain a sewage lagoon
may be implied in the statutory grant of power relied upon
by plaintiff. See Illinois State Toll Highway Commission v.
Eden Cemetery Association, 16 I11.2d 539, 158 N.E.2d 766,
769-770 (1959), where the court said in connection with
condemnation for service facilities on toll highways, 'We
think . . . . that since access to sewer and water facilities is
essential to the operation of service stations and restaurants,
the reasoning which sustains the propriety of arrangements
for the latter must uphold as well a reasonable exercise of
condemnation powers in obtaining the former.' See also
Tormaschy v. Hjelle, N.D., 210 N.W.2d 100 (1973).
Although defendants cite Great Salt Lake Authority v. Island
Ranching Co., 18 Utah 2d 276, 421 P.2d 504 (1966), for
the contention that the power to condemn cannot be obtained
by implication, their reliance is misplaced. In that case the
authority was created by statute to preserve and develop the
Great Salt Lake, but its statutory powers with reference to
the acquisition of property on Antelope Island did not
include the right to take by eminent domain. Plaintiff in the
present case clearly has express statutory condemnation
powers for highway purposes." {Utah DOT v. Fuller, 603
P.2d 814,816 (Utah 1979))
In the case sub judice, the reverse exists. The city has indisputable power
to condemn extraterritorially for public utilities (water and sewer lines), and
therefore it must, under the rationale of Fuller by that same "necessary
implication" possess the power to condemn for the road in which to locate, access
and maintain those public utilities.
24

"We think it is generally agreed that where the right of
eminent domain is granted for a particular purpose, then the
statute must be given a liberal construction in furtherance of
such purposes." (Monetaire Mining Co. v. Columbus Rexall
Consol. Mines Co., 53 Utah 413, 422, 174 P. 172, 175
(1918))
*

*

*

"The powers herein delegated to any municipality shall be
liberally construed to permit the municipality to exercise the
powers granted by this act except in cases clearly contrary to
the intent of the law." (UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-1-103
(2001))
The constitutional grant to Utah municipalities is so concise and
unequivocal that there are no recorded cases of any successful challenge to a
municipalities' exercise of those powers since statehood.

The only reported

appellate decision in Utah wherein extraterritorial condemnation was challenged
arose in Bertagnoli v. Baker, 111 Utah 348, 215 P.2d 626 (Utah 1950) heavily
relied upon herein and below by Appellants. In that case the Salt Lake City
School Board, (not the City itself, but a separate legislatively created entity9)

9

"In previous decisions of this court we have recognized that boards of education
are public municipal corporations; that their powers are purely statutory; and that
the legislature may authorize the governing authorities of school districts to do
anything not prohibited by the Constitution. Also, that the boards of education
have only such powers as are expressly conferred upon them and such implied
powers as are necessary to execute and carry into effect their express powers.
Chamberlain v. Watters, 10 Utah 298, 37 P. 566; Beard v. Board of Education,
81 Utah 51, 16 P.2d 900. Thus we must examine the statutes of this state to
determine the extent of the authority given to boards of education to condemn land
for proper purposes." (Bertagnoli, p. 628)
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attempted to condemn property outside its jurisdictional boundaries. This Court
recognized the general principles above set forth, citing both

NICHOLS and

McQUILLIN allowing municipal extraterritorial condemnation where expressly
granted or necessarily implied, but refused to extend that extraterritorial
condemnation powers to a School Board:
"In McQuillin on Municipal Corporations, Second Ed., Revised,
Sec. 1619, pg. 546, it is stated that fa municipal corporation cannot
condemn land within the state but outside its corporate limits unless
the power has been delegated by the legislature.' See Lewis,
Eminent Domain, 3rd Ed., Sec. 371, for a similar statement. When
the power of eminent domain is given by statute, it is a well settled
principle of law amply supported by cases from many jurisdictions in
this country, that the extent to which the power may be exercised is
limited to the express terms and clear implication of the statute. City
of Birmingham v. Brown, 241 Ala. 203, 2 So.2d 305; Maine-New
Hampshire Interstate Bridge Authority v. Ham, 91 N.H. 179, 16
A.2d 362; Detroit G. H. and M. Railway Company v. Weber, 24,
Mich. 28, 226 N.W. 663; U. S. v. Threlkeld, 10 Cir., 72 F.2d 464,
certiorari denied 293 U. S. 620, 55 S.Ct. 215, 79 L. Ed. 708; State
ex rel. King County v. Superior Court for King County, Wash., 204
P.2d 514; Lewis, Eminent Domain, 3rd Ed., Sec. 371." (emphasis
added)
The Court denied the School Board extraterritorial condemnation power in the
absence of either an express statutory grant or a more logically implied grant of
such power other than the argued silence of the Legislature and/or the absence of
a specific prohibition denying Boards that power:
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"Thus it follows that the authority contended for by the
School Board not having been expressly given and not
being clearly inferable from our statutes, must be denied it.
Under the authorities on this subject, power cannot be
derived from the doubtful inferences which support the
School Board's claim of authority." (Zrf.)(emphasis added)
While Bertagnoli is Appellants chief case, it is simply not helpful precedent.
Without such broad extraterritorial powers municipalities would often be
precluded from providing even the most basic public utilities and services such as
water, electricity, sewer, solid waste disposal, and airports

because those

amenities are often located in remote areas beyond city boundaries, the more
obnoxious of those facilities being deliberately planned and constructed some
distance outside city boundaries

so as to avoid creating public nuisances in

residential and commercial areas. Those facilities require access roads and streets
and it is absurd to suggest that municipalities can create or develop such facilities
but cannot create extraterritorially the necessary public streets to access and
maintain them.

Accordingly Utah, like most states in the Union, expressly

provided for extraterritorial condemnation powers in cities to allow them to
provide basic services and utilities.
Cities must be able to plan for the orderly flow of traffic in, out and
through their jurisdictions and allow for future connections and alignments with
existing streets in other jurisdictions and with interstate facilities. Cities often
have temporary pockets of unincorporated
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land within or adjacent

their

boundaries awaiting petitions for annexation and it is absurd to suggest that all
city streets and service facilities have to terminate at the boundaries of said
unincorporated property or take a circuitous temporary alignment.

Such a

truncated planning system would lead to absurd temporary street configurations
and traffic congestion, the avoidance of which can only be resolved by permitted
annexation with windfall concessions to landowners who could prevent the
acquisition of rights of way for needed public utilities and services through their
property if eminent domain was unavailable. Those concessions often result in an
exorbitant extracted

purchase price or outlandish development concessions

(development fee waivers, increased permitted density development, zoning
concessions, etc.,)- and it is precisely for that reason that the Legislature
protected, by Constitutional guarantee not capable of abridgment by subsequent
legislation, municipalities extraterritorial eminent domain powers to provide all of
their basic public services and utilities, not the least of which are the public streets
allowing orderly flow of traffic in, out, and through a city and the placement
therein the ancillary additional public utilities commonly located therein.
Summary
A city is a living and vibrant creation. It must, like the human body, have the
necessary circulatory vessels to transport in, out and through its being its life
supporting commodities- water, sewer, electricity, gas, communication facilities
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and, most importantly, the people who

comprise the city and produce and

consume those commodities. It cannot be strangled by imposing restrictions on its
ability to procure the necessary rights to maintain its life sustaining systems. For
this reason the Constitution granted extremely broad extraterritorial condemnation
powers to municipalities to insure their growth, vitality and survival-imposing
strong prohibition on any attempted constriction of those powers. Public streets
are the aorta in this system. Within their margins are customarily located all of
the smaller vessels carrying ancillary services and utilities— water, sewer, gas, and
along its boundaries electric power and communication facilities. It makes no
sense to suggest that a city has the ability to transport all those commodities in and
out of its borders through extraterritorial condemnation of the requisite easements,
but the inability to also construct on said easements a street to access and maintain
those facilities and to transport the people who produce and consume those items.
Clearly no more basic "service" is provided by a city that the construction and
maintenance of transportation facilities-whether they be generally classified as
"services" of "utilities." Without the power to circulate its residents in and out of
its corporate limits with streets that sometimes have to traverse temporarily
unincorporated areas to reach county or state roads a city would suffocate in its
own congestion. While the power of eminent domain, being in derogation of
private property rights, is to be strictly construed and applied, the allowance of
easements which encumber the surface use rights of property obtained to provide
29

circulation of human necessities (water, gas, sewer, electricity) to be additionally
used for the circulation of those who consume or produce those necessities seems
both logical and non-prejudicial to those already encumbered property rights. But
the City is not to prevail herein because of "reasoned and logical necessity"-it is
to prevail because it has the Constitutional right to condemn extraterritorially—a
right that cannot be abridged.
Relief Sought
The Order of Immediate Occupancy entered below finding that the City has
the "right to take" the subject easements for construction and maintenance of a
public street, water and sewer facilities should be affirmed.

DATED this J7t:
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Addendum "B"
By open Court stipulation of Counsel at the hearing on the Order of
Immediate Occupancy, the sole issue reserved for appeal was the issue of
extraterritorial condemnation. The landowners offered not a scintilla of evidence
or argument as to any other issue. The RULING ON MOTION FOR ORDER
OF IMMEDIATE OCCUPANCY included the following finding:
"9. The Defendants have not required Plaintiff to produce any
additional testimony or evidence regarding the necessity for the
"taking," the reasons for a speedy and immediate occupancy of the
premises, the relative equities of granting or denying occupancy
pendente lite, or any and all other factors required and prescribed
by UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-9 (2001), said Defendants
acknowledging that all such factors exist justifying entry of an
order of immediate occupancy other than their claim that the
Plaintiff lacks extraterritorial condemnation powers to condemn
their property for purposes of a public street. Defendants deny that
this Court has jurisdiction to entertain this action because the
subject property is unincorporated and not within the boundaries of
Provo City." (R. 333)
Therefore the following "facts" or "findings" in Appellants' Brief, undesignated
by citation to the Record below, are irrelevant and immaterial to the singular
issue reserved by stipulation of Counsel to be presented on appeal:
l. "Spring Canyon's property is located on the benchland approximately 100
feet above the road to which Provo City intends to connect the proposed
road." (Appellants Brief, p. 3) (Unsupported by the record and irrelevant
and immaterial)

i

2. "This problem [an island within the City] was created by the city's own
annexation actions." (Appellants Brief, p. 3)(Argument not applicable to any
issue herein)

3.

"The Provo Municipal Council purportedly passed a resolution (2000-116)
providing for the condemnation of the Spring Canyon's property on
December 19, 2000 (Rec, Pg. 2) Roughly eighteen months passed before
Provo City took official action pursuant to this resolution. (Rec. Pg. 35). . .
In its resolution, the Provo Municipal Council stated that the purpose of the
connector road was to ease traffic congestion created by the Riverwoods
shopping center and other businesses located on the west side of University
Avenue. (Rec. Pg. 112 & 2.) (Appellants Brief, p. 4) [ And the balance of
the factual recitation implying that the Resolutions and Complaint are
disparate or defective is irrelevant and immaterial to the issue reserved]

4. "Although it will only create two lanes for automobile traffic, the proposed
road design constitutes 83 (eighty-three) feet of right of way, to flare to 93
(ninety-three) feet as it approaches the Canyon Road from the west. (Rec. Pg.
102-103).

It will require raising the

level of the land sought to be

condemned by 6' as it approaches the brow of the benchland." (Appellants

ii

Brief, p. 5) (Again, no issue was raised or preserved concerning the
"excessiveness" of the take, nor the public need or public use.)

5. "Spring Canyons presently use the land for agricultural purposes and in the
operation of a livestock business. (Rec. Pg. 334 & 322-304). The proposed
road will sever Spring Canyon's property, leaving a parcel located in the
northeast section of their existing property. (See Map of Spring Canyon's
Land, attached hereto as Exhibit "F", Rec. Pg. 118; see also Highlighted
Map attached as Exhibit "G"). This action will essentially destroy Spring
Canyon's use of the land. The construction of the road will not allow Spring
Canyon to use the remaining land in its livestock operation because the
lambing operations would be disturbed by the proximity of a major road."
(Appellants Brief, p. 6) (Appellant omits to inform the Court that the City
originally included the severed piece as an "uneconomic remnant" and
planned on including it in the take—but it was "excluded" from the "taking"
by stipulation of the parties after the Appellants requested the same—again,
inflammatory argument, but not in the least relevant to the sole issue reserved
for appeal.)
"6. The proposed construction of the connector street would sever
the Defendants property leaving a parcel located in the northeast
section of their existing property. Plaintiff included within its
Amended Complaint a request to condemn that parcel on the theory
that it was an "uneconomic remnant" and the conduct of the City
effectively, if not literally, constituted such an interference with the
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use and utility of said severed parcel as to constitute a de facto
"taking" thereof. Plaintiff has acknowledged that the "taking" of
said severed parcel is not necessary to the accomplishment of the
public purpose for which the other perpetual easements are sought
(i.e., the 4800 North connection) and has offered to delete said
severed parcel from the Amended Complaint should the Defendants
desire. The Defendants have indicated their desire that said parcel
not be included within the "take" and, accordingly, by mutual
stipulation of the parties, said parcel is to be stricken from the
description of the property interests to be acquired herein by
eminent domain." (R. 334)
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Addendum C Constitutional and Statutory Provisions
UTAH CONSTITUTION, art XI, sec. 5
Sec. 5. [Cities and towns not to be created by special laws - Legislature to
provide for the incorporation, organization, dissolution, and classification of
cities and towns - Charter cities.]
The Legislature may not create cities or towns by special laws.
The Legislature by statute shall provide for the incorporation, organization and
dissolution of cities and towns and for their classification in proportion to
population. Any incorporated city or town may frame and adopt a charter for its
own government in the following manner:
The legislative authority of the city may, by two-thirds vote of its members, and
upon petition of qualified electors to the number of fifteen per cent of all votes
cast at the next preceding election for the office of the mayor, shall forthwith
provide by ordinance for the submission to the electors of the question: "Shall a
commission be chosen to frame a charter?" The ordinance shall require that the
question be submitted to the electors at the next regular municipal election. The
ballot containing such question shall also contain the names of candidates for
members of the proposed commission, but without party designation. Such
candidates shall be nominated in the same manner as required by law for
nomination of city officers. If a majority of the electors voting on the question of
choosing a commission shall vote in the affirmative, then the fifteen candidates
receiving a majority of the votes cast at such election, shall constitute the charter
commission, and shall proceed to frame a charter.
Any charter so framed shall be submitted to the qualified electors of the city at
an election to be held at a time to be determined by the charter commission,
which shall be not less than sixty days subsequent to its completion and
distribution among the electors and not more than one year from such date.
Alternative provisions may also be submitted to be voted upon separately. The
commission shall make provisions for the distribution of copies of the proposed
charter and of any alternative provisions to the qualified electors of the city, not
less than sixty days before the election at which it is voted upon. Such proposed
charter and such alternative provisions as are approved by a majority of the
electors voting thereon, shall become an organic law of such city at such time as
may be fixed therein, and shall supersede any existing charter and all laws
affecting the organization and government of such city which are now in conflict
therewith. Within thirty days after its approval a copy of such charter as
adopted, certified by the mayor and city recorder and authenticated by the seal of
such city, shall be made in duplicate and deposited, one in the office of the
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secretary of State and the other in the office of the city recorder, and thereafter
all courts shall take judicial notice of such charter.
Amendments to any such charter may be framed and submitted by a charter
commission in the same manner as provided for making of charters, or may be
proposed by the legislative authority of the city upon a two-thirds vote thereof,
or by petition of qualified electors to a number equal to fifteen per cent of the
total votes cast for mayor on the next preceding election, and any such
amendment may be submitted at the next regular municipal election, and having
been approved by the majority of the electors voting thereon, shall become part
of the charter at the time fixed in such amendment and shall be certified and filed
as provided in case of charters.
Each city forming its charter under this section shall have, and is hereby granted,
the authority to exercise all powers relating to municipal affairs, and to adopt
and enforce within its limits, local police, sanitary and similar regulations not in
conflict with the general law, and no enumeration of powers in this constitution
or any law shall be deemed to limit or restrict the general grant of authority
hereby conferred; but this grant of authority shall not include the power to
regulate public utilities, not municipally owned, if any such regulation of public
utilities is provided for by general law, nor be deemed to limit or restrict the
power of the legislature in matters relating to State affairs, to enact general laws
applicable alike to all cities of the State.
The power to be conferred upon the cities by this section shall include the
following:
(a) To levy, assess and collect taxes and borrow money, within the
limits prescribed by general law, and to levy and collect special
assessments for benefits conferred.
(b) To furnish all local public services, to purchase, hire,
construct, own, maintain and operate, or lease, public utilities local
in extent and use; to acquire by condemnation, or otherwise, within
or without the corporate limits, property necessary for any such
purposes, subject to restrictions imposed by general law for the
protection of other communities; and to grant local public utility
franchises and within its powers regulate the exercise thereof.
(c) To make local public improvements and to acquire by
condemnation, or otherwise, property within its corporate limits
necessary for such improvements; and also to acquire an excess
over than [that] needed for any such improvement and to sell or
lease such excess property with restrictions, in order to protect and
preserve the improvement.
(d) To issue and sell bonds on the security of any such excess
prog«j|y, or of any public utility owned by the city, or of the
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revenues thereof, or both, including, in the case of public utility, a
franchise stating the terms upon which, in case of foreclosure, the
purchaser may operate such utility.
History: Const. 1896; L. 1999, S.J.R. 5, § 8.
Provisions from the UTAH CODE ANN.
10-1-103. Construction.
The powers herein delegated to any municipality shall be liberally construed to
permit the municipality to exercise the powers granted by this act except in cases
clearly contrary to the intent of the law.
History: C. 1953, 10-1-103, enacted by L. 1977, ch. 48, § 1.
10-1-201. Municipalities as political subdivisions of the state.
Municipalities shall be political subdivisions of the State of Utah, municipal
corporations, and bodies politic with perpetual existence unless disincorporated
according to law.
History: C. 1953, 10-1-201, enacted by L. 1977, ch. 48, § 1.
10-7-4. Water supply - Acquisition - Condemnation - Protest - Special
election.
The board of commissioners, city council or board of trustees of any city or
town may acquire, purchase or lease all or any part of any water, waterworks
system, water supply or property connected therewith, and whenever the
governing body of a city or town shall deem it necessary for the public good
such city or town may bring condemnation proceedings to acquire the same;
provided, that if within thirty days after the passage and publication of a
resolution or ordinance for the purchase or lease or condemnation herein
provided for one-third of the resident taxpayers of the city or town, as shown by
the assessment roll, shall protest against the purchase, lease or condemnation
proceedings contemplated, such proposed purchase, lease or condemnation shall
be referred to a special election, and if confirmed by a majority vote thereat,
shall take effect; otherwise it shall be void. In all condemnation proceedings the
value of land affected by the taking must be considered in connection with the
water or water rights taken for the purpose of supplying the city or town or the
inhabitants thereof with water.
History: L. 1903, ch. 103, § 1; C.L. 1907, § 206x2; C.L. 1917, § 575; R.S.
1933 & C. 1943, 15-7-4.
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10-8-8. Streets, parks, airports, parking facilities, public grounds and
pedestrian malls.
They may lay out, establish, open, alter, widen, narrow, extend, grade, pave or
otherwise improve streets, alleys, avenues, boulevards, sidewalks, parks,
airports, parking lots or other facilities for the parking of vehicles off streets,
public grounds, and pedestrian malls and may vacate the same or parts thereof,
by ordinance.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 206, subd. 8; L. 1911, ch. 120, § 1; 1915,
ch. 100, § 1; C.L. 1917, § 570x8; L. 1919, ch. 11, § 1; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,
15-8-8; L. 1965, ch. 18, § [1]; 1966 (2nd S.S.), ch. 1, § 1.
10-9-302. Plan preparation.
(1) (a) The planning commission shall make and recommend to the legislative
body a proposed general plan for the area within the municipality.
(b) The plan may include areas outside the boundaries of the municipality if, in
the commission's judgment, they are related to the planning of the municipality's
territory.
(c) Except as otherwise provided by law, when the plan of a municipality
involves territory outside the boundaries of the municipality, the municipality
may not take action affecting that territory without the concurrence of the county
or other municipalities affected.
(2) The general plan, with the accompanying maps, plats, charts and descriptive
and explanatory matter, shall show the planning commission's recommendations
for the development of the territory covered by the plan, and may include,
among other things:
(a) a land use element that:
(i) designates the proposed general distribution and location and extent of uses of
land for housing, business, industry, agriculture, recreation, education, public
buildings and grounds, open space, and other categories of public and private
uses of land as appropriate; and
(ii) may include a statement of the standards of population density and building
intensity recommended for the various land use categories covered by the plan;
(b) a transportation and circulation element consisting of the general location and
extent of existing and proposed freeways, arterial and collector streets, mass
transit, and any other modes of transportation that are appropriate, all correlated
with the land use element of the plan;
(c) an environmental element that addresses:
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(i) the protection, conservation, development, and use of natural resources,
including the quality of air, forests, soils, rivers and other waters, harbors,
fisheries, wildlife, minerals, and other natural resources; and
(ii) the reclamation of land, flood control, prevention and control of the pollution
of streams and other waters, regulation of the use of land on hillsides, stream
channels and other environmentally sensitive areas, the prevention, control, and
correction of the erosion of soils, protection of watersheds and wetlands, and the
mapping of known geologic hazards;
(d) a public services and facilities element showing general plans for sewage,
waste disposal, drainage, local utilities, rights-of-way, easements, and facilities
for them, police and fire protection, and other public services;
(e) a rehabilitation, redevelopment, and conservation element consisting of plans
and programs for:
(i) historic preservation; and
(ii) the elimination of blight and for redevelopment, including housing sites,
business and industrial sites, and public building sites;
(f) an economic element composed of appropriate studies and an economic
development plan that may include review of municipal revenue and
expenditures, revenue sources, identification of base and residentiary industry,
primary and secondary market areas, employment, and retail sales activity;
(g) recommendations for implementing the plan, including the use of zoning
ordinances, subdivision ordinances, capital improvement plans, and other
appropriate actions; and
(h) any other elements the municipality considers appropriate.
History: C. 1953, 10-9-302, enacted by L. 1991, ch. 235, § 13; 1992, ch. 23,
§ 7; 1992, ch. 93, § 3.
10-9-409. Existing outdoor advertising uses.
(1) A municipality may only require termination of a billboard and associated
property rights through:
(a) gift;
(b) purchase;
(c) agreement;
(d) exchange; or
(e) eminent domain.
(2) A termination under Subsection (l)(a), (b), (c), or (d) requires the voluntary
consent of the billboard owner.
History: C. 1953, 10-9-409, enacted by L. 1997, ch. 263, § 1.
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10-15-5. Powers of acquisition and improvement.
The legislative body of the municipalities shall also have the power to acquire by
gift, purchase, eminent domain, or otherwise, land, real property or rights of
way which shall become part of the municipal street established as a pedestrian
mall, or which shall otherwise be used by the municipality as a part of, or for
purposes connected with, a pedestrian mall, and such lands, real property or
rights of way may be improved in the same manner as municipal streets may be
improved. The legislative body shall also have the power to make such
improvements on mall intersections and intersecting streets or upon facilities
acquired for parking and other related purposes where such improvements are
necessary or convenient to the operation of the mall. The acquisitions and
improvements authorized by this section shall be deemed "improvements."
History: L. 1966 (2nd S.S.), ch. 2, § 5.
17-36-3. Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Accrual basis of accounting" means a method where revenues are recorded
when earned and expenditures recorded when they become liabilities
notwithstanding that the receipt of the revenue or payment of the expenditure
may take place in another accounting period.
(2) "Appropriation" means an allocation of money for a specific purpose.
(3) (a) "Budget" means a plan for financial operations for a fiscal period,
embodying estimates for proposed expenditures for given purposes and the
means of financing the expenditures.
(b) "Budget" may refer to the budget of a fund for which a budget is required by
law, or collectively to the budgets for all those funds.
(4) "Budgetary fund" means a fund for which a budget is required, such as those
described in Section 17-36-8.
(5) "Budget officer" means the county auditor, county clerk, or county executive
as provided in Subsection 17-19-19(1).
(6) "Budget period" means the fiscal period for which a budget is prepared.
(7) "Check" means an order in a specific amount drawn upon the depositary by
any authorized officer in accordance with Section 17-19-3 or 17-24-1.
(8) "Countywide service" means a service provided in both incorporated and
unincorporated areas of a county.
(9) "Current period" means the fiscal period in which a budget is prepared and
adopted.
(10) "Department" means any functional unit within a fund which carries on a
specific activity.
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(11) "Encumbrance system" means a method of budgetary control where part of
an appropriation is reserved to cover a specific expenditure by charging
obligations, such as purchase orders, contracts, or salary commitments to an
appropriation account. An expenditure ceases to be an encumbrance when paid
or when the actual liability is entered in the books of account.
(12) "Estimated revenue" means any revenue estimated to be received during the
budget period in any fund for which a budget is prepared.
(13) "Fiscal period" means the annual or biennial period for recording county
fiscal operations.
(14) "Fund" means an independent fiscal and accounting entity comprised of a
sum of money or other resources segregated for a specific purpose or objective.
(15) "Fund balance" means the excess of the assets over liabilities, reserves, and
contributions, as reflected by its books of account.
(16) "Fund deficit" means the excess of liabilities, reserves, and contributions
over its assets, as reflected by its books of account.
(17) "General Fund" means the fund used to account for all receipts,
disbursements, assets, liabilities, reserves, fund balances, revenues, and
expenditures not required to be accounted for in other funds.
(18) "Interfund loan" means a loan of cash from one fund to another, subject to
future repayment; but it does not constitute an expenditure or a use of retained
earnings, fund balance, or unappropriated surplus of the lending fund.
(19) "Last completed fiscal period" means the fiscal period next preceding the
current period.
(20) "Modified accrual basis of accounting" means a method under which
expenditures other than accrued interest on general long-term debt are recorded
at the time liabilities are incurred and revenues are recorded when they become
measurable and available to finance expenditures of the current period.
(21) "Municipal capital project" means the acquisition, construction, or
improvement of capital assets that facilitate providing municipal service.
(22) "Municipal service" means a service not provided on a countywide basis
and not accounted for in an enterprise fund, and includes police patrol, fire
protection, culinary or irrigation water retail service, water conservation, local
parks, sewers, sewage treatment and disposal, cemeteries, garbage and refuse
collection, street lighting, airports, planning and zoning, local streets and roads,
curb, gutter, and sidewalk maintenance, and ambulance service.
(23) "Retained earnings" means that part of the net earnings retained by an
enterprise or internal service fund which is not segregated or reserved for any
specific purpose.
(24) "Special fund" means any fund other than the General Fund, such as those
described in Section 17-36-6.
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(25) "Unappropriated surplus" means that part of a fund which is not
appropriated for an ensuing budget period.
(26) "Warrant" means an order in a specific amount drawn upon the treasurer by
the auditor.
History: L. 1975, ch. 22, § 3; 1983, ch. 71, § 1; 1983, ch. 73, § 2; 1985, ch.
210, § 1; 1986, ch. 105, § 1; 1996, ch. 212, § 10; 1999, ch. 300, § 18; 2001,
ch. 241, § 52.
54-2-1. Definitions.
As used in this title:
*

*

*

*

(15) (a) "Public utility" includes every railroad corporation, gas corporation,
electrical corporation, distribution electrical cooperative, wholesale electrical
cooperative, telephone corporation, telegraph corporation, water corporation,
sewerage corporation, heat corporation, and independent energy producer not
described in Subsection (15)(d), where the service is performed for, or the
commodity delivered to, the public generally, or in the case of a gas corporation
or electrical corporation where the gas or electricity is sold or furnished to any
member or consumers within the state for domestic, commercial, or industrial
use.
*

*

*

*

History: L. 1917, ch. 47, art. 2, § 1; C.L. 1917, § 4782; L. 1925, ch. 12, § 1;
R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 76-2-1; L. 1948 (1st S.S.), ch. 7, § 1; 1957, ch. 106, §
1; 1959, ch. 94, § 1; 1965, ch. 106, § 1; 1969, ch. 153, § 1; 1984, ch. 50, § 1;
1985, ch. 97, § 1; 1985, ch. 98, § 1; 1985, ch. 180, § 1; 1985, ch. 188, § 1;
1985, ch. 253, § 1; 1986, ch. 13; 1986, ch. 194, § 8; 1986, ch. 215, § 1; 1989,
ch. 20, § 1; 1992, ch. 227, § 1; 1995, ch. 173, § 3; 1995, ch. 316, § 6; 1996,
ch. 170, § 47; 2000, ch. 55, § 1; 2001, ch. 212, § 1.
72-3-103. County roads - Class B roads - Construction and maintenance by
counties.
(1) County roads comprise all public highways, roads, and streets within the
state that:
(a) are situated outside of incorporated municipalities and not designated as state
highways;
(b) have been designated as county roads; or
(c) are located on property under the control of a federal agency and constructed
or maintained by the county under agreement with the appropriate federal
agency.
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(2) County roads are class B roads.
(3) The state and county have joint undivided interest in the title to all rights-ofway for all county roads.
(4) The county governing body exercises sole jurisdiction and control of county
roads within the county.
(5) The county shall construct and maintain each county road using funds made
available for that purpose.
(6) The county legislative body may expend funds allocated to each county from
the Transportation Fund under rules made by the department.
(7) A county legislative body may use any portion of the class B road funds
provided by this chapter for the construction and maintenance of class A state
roads by cooperative agreement with the department.
(8) A county may enter into agreements with the appropriate federal agency for
the use of federal funds, county road funds, and donations to county road funds
to construct, improve, or maintain county roads within or partly within national
forests.
History: L. 1963, ch. 39, § 22; 1967, ch. 50, § 1; 1991, ch. 137, § 13; 1993,
ch. 227, § 296; 1994, ch. 120, § 31; C. 1953, 27-12-22; renumbered by L.
1998, ch. 270, § 72; 2000, ch. 324, § 2.
72-3-104. City streets - Class C roads - Construction and maintenance.
(1) City streets comprise:
(a) highways, roads, and streets within the corporate limits of the municipalities
that are not designated as class A state roads or as class B roads; and
(b) those highways, roads, and streets located within a national forest and
constructed or maintained by the municipality under agreement with the
appropriate federal agency.
(2) City streets are class C roads.
(3) Except for city streets within counties of the first and second class as defined
in Section 17-16-13, the state and city have joint undivided interest in the title to
all rights-of-way for all city streets.
(4) The municipal governing body exercises sole jurisdiction and control of the
city streets within the municipality.
(5) The department shall cooperate with the municipal legislative body in the
construction and maintenance of the class C roads within each municipality.
(6) The municipal legislative body shall expend or cause to be expended upon the
class C roads the funds allocated to each municipality from the Transportation
Fund under rules made by the department.
(7) Any town or city in the third class may:
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(a) contract with the county or the department for the construction and
maintenance of class C roads within its corporate limits; or
(b) transfer, with the consent of the county, its:
(i) class C roads to the class B road system; and
(ii) funds allocated from the Transportation Fund to the municipality to the
county legislative body for use upon die transferred class C roads.
(8) A municipal legislative body of any municipality of the third class may use
any portion of the class C road funds allocated to the municipality for the
construction of sidewalks, curbs, and gutters on class A state roads within the
municipal limits by cooperative agreement with the department.
History: L. 1963, ch. 39, § 23; 1969, ch. 67, § 1; 1991, ch. 137, § 14; 1993,
ch. 227, § 297; 1994, ch. 120, § 32; C. 1953, 27-12-23; renumbered by L.
1998, ch. 270, § 73; 2000, ch. 324, § 3.
72-5-401. Definitions.
As used in this part:
(1) "Corridor" means the path or proposed path of a transportation facility that
exists or that may exist in the future. A corridor may include the land occupied
or to be occupied by a transportation facility, and any other land that may be
needed for expanding a transportation facility or for controlling access to it.
(2) "Corridor preservation" means planning or acquisition processes intended to:
(a) protect or enhance the capacity of existing corridors; and
(b) protect the availability of proposed corridors in advance of the need for and
the actual commencement of the transportation facility construction.
(3) "Development" means:
(a) the subdividing of land;
(b) the construction of improvements, expansions, or additions; or
(c) any other action that will appreciably increase the value of and the future
acquisition cost of land.
(4) "Official map" means a map, drawn by government authorities and recorded
in county recording offices that:
(a) shows actual and proposed rights-of-way, centerline alignments, and setbacks
for highways and other transportation facilities;
(b) provides a basis for restricting development in designated rights-of-way or
between designated setbacks to allow the government authorities time to
purchase or otherwise reserve the land; and
(c) for counties and municipalities may be adopted as an element of the general
plan, pursuant to Title 17, Chapter 27, Part 3, General Plan, or Title 10,
Chapter 9, Part 3, General Plan.
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(5) "Taking" means an act or regulation, either by exercise of eminent domain or
other police power, whereby government puts private property to public use or
restrains use of private property for public purposes, and that requires
compensation to be paid to private property owners.
History: C. 1953, 72-5-401, enacted by L. 2000, ch. 34, § 9.
72-5-402. Public purpose.
The Legislature finds and declares that the planning and preservation of
transportation corridors is a public purpose, that the acquisition of public rights
in private property for possible use as a transportation corridor up to 20 years in
advance is a public purpose, and that acquisition of public rights in private
property for possible use as alternative transportation corridors is a public
purpose, even if one or more of the transportation corridors is eventually not
used for a public purpose, so long as reasonable evidence exists at the time of
acquisition that the corridor will be developed within 20 years.
History: C. 1953, 72-5-402, enacted by L. 2000, ch. 34, § 10.
72-5-403. Transportation corridor preservation powers.
(1) The department, counties, and municipalities may:
(a) act in cooperation with one another and other government entities to promote
planning for and enhance the preservation of transportation corridors and to
more effectively use the monies available in the Transportation Corridor
Preservation Revolving Loan Fund created in Section 72-2-117;
(b) undertake transportation corridor planning, review, and preservation
processes; and
(c) acquire fee simple rights and other rights of less than fee simple, including
easement and development rights, or the rights to limit development, including
rights in alternative transportation corridors, and to make these acquisitions up to
20 years in advance of using those rights in actual transportation facility
construction.
(2) In addition to the powers described under Subsection (1), counties and
municipalities may:
(a) limit development for transportation corridor preservation by land use
regulation and by official maps; and
(b) by ordinance prescribe procedures for approving limited development in
transportation corridors until the time transportation facility construction begins.
History: C. 1953, 72-5-403, enacted by L. 2000, ch. 34, § 11.
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72-5-405. Private owner rights.
(1) The department, counties, and municipalities shall observe all protections
conferred on private property rights, including Title 63, Chapter 90, Private
Property Protection Act, Title 63, Chapter 90a, Constitutional Taking Issues,
and compensation for takings.
(2) Private property owners from whom less than fee simple rights are obtained
for transportation corridors or transportation corridor preservation have the right
to petition the department, a county, or a municipality to acquire the entire fee
simple interest in the affected property.
(3) (a) A private property owner whose property's development is limited or
restricted by a power granted under this part may petition the county or
municipality that adopted the official map to acquire less than or the entire fee
simple interest in the affected property, at the option of the property owner.
(b) If the county or municipality petitioned under Subsection (3)(a) does not
acquire the interest in the property requested by the property owner, then the
county or municipality may not exercise any of the powers granted under this
part to limit or restrict the affected property's development.
History: C. 1953, 72-5-405, enacted by L. 2000, ch. 34, § 13.
72-10-413. Purchase or condemnation of air rights or navigation easements.
A political subdivision within which the property or nonconforming use is
located or the political subdivision owning the airport or served by it may
acquire, by purchase, grant, or condemnation in the manner provided by the law
under which political subdivisions are authorized to acquire real property for
public purposes, an air right, navigation easement, or other estate or interest in
the property or nonconforming structure or use in question if:
(1) it is desired to remove, lower, or otherwise terminate a nonconforming
structure or use;
(2) the approach protection necessary cannot, because of constitutional
limitations, be provided by airport zoning regulations under this part; or
(3) it appears advisable that the necessary approach protection be provided by
acquisition of property rights rather than by airport zoning regulations.
History: L. 1945, ch. 10, § 13; C. 1943, Supp., 4-0-80; C. 1953, 2-4-13;
renumbered by L. 1998, ch. 270, § 320.
78-34-1. Uses for which right may be exercised.
Subject to the provisions of this chapter, the right of eminent domain may be
exercised in behalf of the following public uses:
(1) All public uses authorized by the Government of the United States.
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(2) Public buildings and grounds for the use of the state, and all other public uses
authorized by the Legislature.
(3) Public buildings and grounds for the use of any county, city or incorporated
town, or board of education; reservoirs, canals, aqueducts, flumes, ditches, or
pipes for conducting water for the use of the inhabitants of any county or city or
incorporated town, or for the draining of any county, city or incorporated town;
the raising of the banks of streams, removing obstructions therefrom, and
widening, deepening or straightening their channels; roads, streets and alleys;
and all other public uses for the benefit of any county, city or incorporated town,
or the inhabitants thereof.
(4) Wharves, docks, piers, chutes, booms, ferries, bridges, toll roads, byroads,
plank and turnpike roads, roads for transportation by traction engines or road
locomotives, roads for logging or lumbering purposes, and railroads and street
railways for public transportation.
(5) Reservoirs, dams, watergates, canals, ditches, flumes, tunnels, aqueducts and
pipes for the supplying of persons, mines, mills, smelters or other works for the
reduction of ores, with water for domestic or other uses, or for irrigation
purposes, or for the draining and reclaiming of lands, or for the floating of logs
and lumber on streams not navigable, or for solar evaporation ponds and other
facilities for the recovery of minerals in solution.
(6) Roads, railroads, tramways, tunnels, ditches, flumes, pipes and dumping
places to facilitate the milling, smelting or other reduction of ores, or the
working of mines, quarries, coal mines or mineral deposits including minerals in
solution; outlets, natural or otherwise, for the deposit or conduct of tailings,
refuse or water from mills, smelters or other works for the reduction of ores, or
from mines, quarries, coal mines or mineral deposits including minerals in
solution; mill dams; gas, oil or coal pipelines, tanks or reservoirs, including any
subsurface stratum or formation in any land for the underground storage of
natural gas, and in connection therewith such other interests in property as may
be required adequately to examine, prepare, maintain, and operate such
underground natural gas storage facilities; and solar evaporation ponds and other
facilities for the recovery of minerals in solution; also any occupancy in common
by the owners or possessors of different mines, quarries, coal mines, mineral
deposits, mills, smelters, or other places for the reduction of ores, or any place
for the flow, deposit or conduct of tailings or refuse matter.
(7) Byroads leading from highways to residences and farms.
(8) Telegraph, telephone, electric light and electric power lines, and sites for
electric light and power plants.
(9) Sewerage of any city or town, or of any settlement of not less than ten
families, or of any public building belonging to the state, or of any college or
university.
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(10) Canals, reservoirs, dams, ditches, flumes, aqueducts and pipes for
supplying and storing water for the operation of machinery for the purpose of
generating and transmitting electricity for power, light or heat.
(11) Cemeteries and public parks.
(12) Pipe lines for the purpose of conducting any and all liquids connected with
the manufacture of beet sugar.
(13) Sites for mills, smelters or other works for the reduction of ores and
necessary to the successful operation thereof, including the right to take lands for
the discharge and natural distribution of smoke, fumes and dust therefrom,
produced by the operation of such works; provided, that the powers granted by
this subdivision shall not be exercised in any county where the population
exceeds twenty thousand, or within one mile of the limits of any city or
incorporated town; nor unless the proposed condemner has the right to operate
by purchase, option to purchase or easement, at least seventy-five per cent in
value of land acreage owned by persons or corporations situated within a radius
of four miles from the mill, smelter or other works for the reduction of ores; nor
beyond the limits of said four-mile radius; nor as to lands covered by contracts,
easements or agreements existing between the condemner and the owner of land
within said limit and providing for the operation of such mill, smelter or other
works for the reduction of ores; nor until an action shall have been commenced
to restrain the operation of such mill, smelter or other works for the reduction of
ores.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, Supp., 104-34-1; L. 1957, ch. 174, §
1; 1963, ch. 193, § 1; 1969, ch. 258, § 1; 1973, ch. 206, § 1; 1981, ch. 164, §
1.
78-34-17. Rights of cities and towns not affected.
Nothing in this chapter must be construed to abrogate or repeal any statute
providing for the taking of property in any city or town for street purposes.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, Supp., 104-34-17.
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